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McConnell: The Dispute on Arctic Sovereignty: A Canadian Appraisal
THE DISPUTE ON ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY:
A CANADIAN APPRAISAL
W. H. MCCONNELL*

A dispute over territorial sovereignty in the Arctic between the United
States and Canada in the seventies is a rather bizarre, and hopefully ephemeral, departure from a longstanding course of good relations. Inhabited by
peoples with broadly similar values and liberal democratic traditions, there
has been a mutual disposition to tolerate occasional differences (including
recent sharp differences over economic policy) and to resolve disagreements
through negotiation, conciliation, and arbitration.1 The recent debate over
the precise extent of Canadian Arctic sovereignty, which erupted with the
discovery of vast oil reserves on Alaska's North Slope in 19682 and somewhat
less valuable discoveries in the Canadian Arctic, does not fit into the characteristic pattern of amicable relations between the two countries.
This dispute encompasses two major areas. The first concerns Canada's
purported exercise of sovereign control over the broad mid-archipelagic Arctic
Ocean corridor traversed by the Humble Oil Company's S. S. Manhattan on
its 1969 Arctic voyage. The second concerns the international legal validity
of the recent Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act3 asserting a qualified
jurisdiction to regulate the design and movements of oil tankers flying any
flag within a hundred-mile maritime belt of the periphery of the Archipelago,
an area considerably beyond the permissible maximum breadth of the territorial sea and contiguous zone according to international agreement. 4
Since the legal status of the Arctic islands is somewhat less controversial
than extensive Canadian control over Arctic waters, and there has been no
B.A. 1955, Carleton University (Ottawa); B.C.L. 1958, New Brunswick; Ph.D. 1968,
Toronto; LL.M. 1970, Saskatchewan. Associate Professor of Law, University of Saskatchewan.
1. One of the most significant arbitral decisions in the present century found Canada
liable to the United States for permitting the escape of noxious sulfur dioxide fumes emitted
by a lead and zinc smelter at Trail, British Columbia, which injured crops in the neighboring state of Washington. In this pathbreaking case on atmospheric pollution, which enunciated the principle that a state is under a duty to prevent its territory from being a source
of economic injury to its neighbor, Canada was held liable in the amount of $350,000 for
allowing the escape of the fumes over the international boundary, see the Trail Smelter
Arbitration Case (1941), UNITED NATIONS REPORTS OF INTERNATIOAL ARanTRrA AwARDS,
III, 1905.
2. Conservative estimates of the oil yield of the Prudhoe Bay area on Alaska's North
Slope range from 5-10 billion barrels, as against a yield of some 5 billion barrels for the
richest oil fields formerly discovered on the Continent, in 1930, in East Texas. NEWSWEEK,
Sept. 22, 1969, at 80.
3.

4.
April
from
1606,

CAu. REv. STAT. c. 2 (ist Supp. 1970).

Article 24 (2) of the Convention on the TerritorialSea and Contiguous Zone, Geneva,
28, 1958, provides that "[t]he contiguous zone may not extend beyond twelve miles
the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured." See 15 U.S.T.
T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
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conspicuous challenge to Canadian sovereignty over the islands, it would be
desirable, initially, to inquire briefly into the foundation of Canada's international title to these archepelagic islands and then to explore the more
contentious issue of the legal incidents flowing from possible ownership of
the permanent ice north of the Canadian mainland. The location and extent
of land territory (and, arguably, permanent ice) serves to delimit appurtenant territorial waters and contiguous zones. A necessary preliminary question, therefore, concerns the exact physical dimensions of the territory that
Canada "possesses" in the Arctic. Once an answer has been suggested to this
logically prior issue, the areas of maritime jurisdiction over Arctic waters and
the development of a concept of Arctic regional law will be discussed.
HISTORICAL ISSUES IN THE ARCTIc

The American Presence in the Arctic
Although Admiral Robert Peary purportedly annexed the North Pole
along with the "entire [Arctic] region" for the United States in 1909, there
has never been any American occupation of it in the sense of an executed
intention of displaying sovereignty over it. The United States State Department has, in fact, declined to endorse Peary's annexation, holding that "ice"
is not subject to national appropriation. Indeed, there had already been
extensive explorations in the adjacent Arctic Archipelago by Americans and
nationals of other countries. Between 1853 and 1873, for example, three
American polar expeditions discovered and explored much of the region of
Ellesmere Island (the northernmost island of the Archipelago) north of Smith
Sound.6 Notable United States Arctic expeditions in the present century were
headed by Commander D. B. MacMillan, U.S.N., who explored the Greenland Coast and Ellesmere and Axel Heiberg Islands (in the Sverdrup Group)
and by Dr. Frederick A. Cook whose claim to have conquered the Pole in
April 1908, exactly a year before Peary, was received with much skepticism
and never officially confirmed.
Even before Peary's claim, in the latter quarter of the nineteenth century
and during the Klondike Gold Rush, there was some Canadian concern that
5. See 1 G. HACKWORTH, INTERNATIONAL LAW 450 (1940).
6. When Canada, in the late 19th century, sought a more definitive grant of the
islands in the Arctic Archipelago from the British Government, the above mentioned discoveries and explorations by American citizens between 1853 and 1873 were among the
reasons cited for the British reluctance to make such a grant: "In view of these discoveries
by American citizens, it is a matter for consideration whether the proposed boundaries
should include the words 'Kennedy Channel and all the islands adjacent thereto.' But as
embracing, as would appear undoubted, British discoveries, the Eastern boundary might be

defined as extending to Smith Sound as far north only as the 78W parallel of latitude.
This, however, subject to the rights of this country established by the discovery of more
northern lands made in the late Arctic expedition." See Letter from the British Admiralty to
the Undersecretary of State of Colonies, Jan. 28, 1879, on file in Arctic Islands Documents,
1873-1880, Dep't of the Interior, Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa.
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the United States might assert territorial claims in the Arctic because of the
large influx of American prospectors, the indefiniteness of international
boundaries, 7 and the use of American currency as legal tender throughout
much of the area. Officials in Ottawa feared that without effective Canadian
countermeasures the whole area might acquire a predominantly American
character resulting in annexation by the United States. As early as 1896,
arrangements were made by the Canadian Government to send substantial
amounts of Canadian currency to the Yukon, partly because it served as a
more satisfactory medium of exchange than gold dust, but more importantly
to emphasize Canadian sovereignty in a remote, sparsely-populated undergoverned area adjacent to American territory.8 Largely for the same reason,
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police detachments in the area were augmented
from a strength of ninety-six at the end of 1897 to 288 officers and men a year
later, with a 203-man contingent comprising the Yukon Field Force following in 1898. 9 In a very few years, however, the Yukon Gold Rush was over
and fears of American annexation subsided.
A further and more recent instance of American presence in the Arctic,
which some Canadians feared might lead to an erosion of Canadian sovereignty, arose from a cooperative venture in continental defense. One of
the last acts of the Truman administration in 1952 was to authorize the
construction of the "Distant Early Warning" (DEW) radar system in the
high Arctic. Following the initial successful testing of an atomic bomb by
the Soviet Union in 1949, there was apprehension of a manned-bomber
attack over the Arctic and the warning system, which consisted eventually of
about fifty radar stations stretched out from Alaska to Baffin Island, a distance of about 3,000 miles, was designed to give the joint defense forces adequate forewarning to repel the attack. Construction of the DEW-line progressed rather slowly in the first two years of the Eisenhower administration
but thereafter much effort was expended to complete the system by mid1957.10 The exclusive jurisdiction of the United States military over many of
these DEW-line installations was a source of Canadian anxieties over sovereignty in the late fifties. As Rea says: "Although these measures were themselves initiated out of fear of a Russian attack on North America, they led to
some concern in Canada when, on a number of occasions, it appeared that
jurisdiction had passed to United States authorities over personnel and facilities located on Canadian territory."'-t Concern of a more trivial nature was

7. The indefiniteness of the boundary between the Alaskan panhandle and British
Columbia, for example, resulted in the creation of an international commission in 1903 to
define the proper boundary, see J. MUNRO, THE ALAsKA BOUNDARY Disptrrz (1970).
8. K. REA, THE PoLrTcAL ECONOMY OF THE CANADIAN NORTH 53 (1968).
9. M. ZASLOW, THE OPENING OF THE CANADIAN NORTH 109 (1971).
10. K. RE, supra note 8, at 308-12; Murphy, The Polar Watch, 56 FORTUNE 246 (1957).
11. Cf. K. RFA, supra note 8, at 53; Allen, Will the Dewline Cost Canada Its Northland?, MACLFAN'S MAGAZINF, May 26, 1956, at 16.
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manifested in the Canadian House of Commons when an American periodical
12
referred to Ellesmere Island as lying "north of Canada."'
Norwegian Explorations in the High Arctic
One of the most hazardous threats to Canadian sovereignty in the high
Arctic arose in 1900 when Norwegian Captain Otto Sverdrup claimed the
Sverdrup Islands, which he had discovered and explored, on behalf of his
Sovereign, Oscar II of Sweden. The Swedish foreign ministry, however,
showed little interest in claiming the Sverdrups and, despite the explorer's
later entreaties, Norway, which separated from Sweden in 1905, adopted a
similar noncommital attitude. The intrepid Norwegian explorer, an associate
of Nansen's on the celebrated Greenland expedition of 1888, made his discoveries while attempting to reach the North Pole by traversing the narrow
channel between Greenland and Ellesmere Island. Diverted from his primary
objective by impenetrable ice in Kennedy Channel, Sverdrup made valuable
topographical observations in northern Greenland, explored the unknown
western part of Ellesmere Island, and discovered and explored the group of
three large islands just west of Ellesmere Island that today bear his name.
The putative Norwegian claim to the Sverdrups was never really pressed,
and the matter was finally resolved in Canada's favour in 1930. In that year,
the Canadian Government paid the estate of the recently deceased Captain
Sverdrup the sum of 67,000 dollars as recompense for his discoveries and extensive explorations in the islands. At the same time, Norway officially
acknowledged Canadian sovereignty over the Sverdrups while expressly rejecting as a basis of title the "sector principle."' 1 After the explicit Norwegian
disavowal of the "sector principle," the London Times optimistically reported: "This friendly action on the part of the Norwegian Government
removes the one possible ground of dispute concerning Arctic sovereignty
in the whole Arctic sector [sic] north of the Canadian mainland."''1 In concluding the matter, Canada rather ungraciously refused a request for equal
treatment for Norwegian nationals in trapping, fishing, and hunting in the
Sverdrup area, citing an order-in-council of 1926 that sought to preserve
hunting and fishing rights over the whole Arctic region for the exclusive
use of the aboriginal population of the Canadian Arctic. 15 The settlement
of this longstanding dispute, nevertheless, removed the one possibly significant
blemish to Canadian title to the islands of the Arctic Archipelago. Since then
there have been no serious claims to the archipelagic islands by any other
nations.

12. K. REA, supra note 8, at 53-54.
13. 1 G. HACKWORT11, supra note 5, at 465.
14. The Times (London), Feb. 7, 1931, at 11, col. 1.
15. See Id.
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The Danish Interest in Ellesmere Island
In 1919 a somewhat triffing international incident caused a reconsideration
of the whole problem of Arctic sovereignty by government circles in Ottawa.
In that year, Danish Greenlanders crossed over the frozen ice to Ellesmere
Island to kill musk oxen. When Canada protested to Copenhagen in a diplomatic note of July 31, 1919,16 the Danish response was that not only Ellesmere but the whole insular formation of Parry Channel was a terra nullius or
"no-man's-land" not falling under the sovereignty of any nation, as indeed it
7
During the controversy the Danish
appeared on many non-British mapsY.
explorer Knud Rasmussen amplified this point of view to his American
confrere Viljhalmur Stefansson: "[A]s every one knows the land of the polar
Eskimo falls under what is known as 'no-man's-land' and there is therefore
no authority in this country except that which I myself am able to exert
through the trading station."'i s Had the Danish viewpoint been accepted, it
would have been a fairly simple matter for Denmark, using Greenland as a
jumping off place, to create an infrastructure of governmental authority in
the remote Archipelago, thereby "occupying" all the islands north of the
mid-archipelagic corridor (or Parry Channel) that, it might be argued, were
as continguous to Greenland as they were to the Canadian mainland.
In much consternation, Canadian officials such as J. B. Harkin, of the
Canadian Department of the Interior, and Loring C. Christie, a youthful
friend of Felix Frankfurter who later became a leading Canadian diplomat,
considered what Canada could do to substantiate her claim to Arctic sovereignty. With reference to Ellesmere, Harkin recommended:1 9
To securely establish Canada's title, occupation and administration are
necessary. Therefore, next spring [1921 ?] an expedition should be sent
north to locate two or three permanent police posts on Ellesmere land
[sic]. This probably should be followed by the transfer of some Canadian Eskimos to the island. Steps should be taken to encourage the
Hudson Bay Co. or other traders to extend their operations northward. It is also desirable that detailed exploration should be carried
out on this and adjoining islands.
In a memorandum to Canadian Prime Minister Arthur Meighen written
about the same time, Christie argued that although the permanent settlement
appropriate for more temperate latitudes would not be feasible in the Arctic,
some form of seasonal occupation should be attempted to forestall a possible
Danish claim.20 Among the suggested acts that the government could rely

16. See Y. BERXAULT, Lzs PROBLAUES POLITIQUES Du NoRn CANADIEN 104 (1942).
17. Cf. T. FAtrLY, SVERDRUP'S ARanc ADVENTURES 278 (ed. 1959).
18. Y. BEIAULT note 16 supra.
19. Harkin, Title to Northern Islands (prepared for the Minister of the Interior,
undated memorandum on file in Arctic Islands Report on Sovereignty, Public Archives of
Canada, Ottawa).
20. Christie, Exploration and Occupation of Northern Arctic Islands, Oct. 28, 1920
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on to demonstrate animus occupandi were the following: (a) mapping expeditions "to complete the mapping of lands already known and to discover
any lands not now known"; (b) the extension of customs, game laws, and
police administration to strategically selected points in the islands; (c)
classifying the vessel conveying the mapping expedition as a "revenue cutter"
to effectuate the objects mentioned in (b); and (d) "[F]or the exploratory
work the name of Mr. Viljhalmur Stefansson suggests itself, both because of
his connection with the previous expedition, and because of the economical
21
method of Arctic exploration and travel which he has developed."
That the Canadian Government was concerned about consolidating its
claim to the more remote Arctic islands near Greenland can be seen from
the swiftness with which it implemented some of the above recommendations.
Beginning in the early 1920's, a large number of Royal Canadian Mounted
Police detachments were established throughout the Arctic Archipelago, including Ellesmere Island.2 2 This was followed shortly by Stefansson's expeditions into the Arctic. 23 By such actions, as well as by the gradual extension
of Canadian governmental, scientific, military, commercial, educational and
hospital facilities in the North, and the failure of the Danes to assert an
adverse title after 1920, Canada's claim to Arctic sovereignty was strengthened.
Even in the absence of adverse national claims, incipient or actual, to
Arctic territory north of the Canadian mainland, Canada would still have to
comply with international law tests, largely as developed in the adjudication
or arbitration of territorial disputes, in order to support her claim to remote,
unpeopled northern islands. It will be necessary, therefore, to consider the
leading cases on acquisition of title to terrae nullius in the international
forum in order to assess the validity of Canada's Arctic claims according to
traditional international law.
THE CASE LAW ON ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY

The King of Italy's arbitration in the Clipperton Island case 24 (named
for John Clipperton an English pirate) involved a barren, unoccupied coral
reef situated about 1,000 miles southwest of Mexico, title to which was in

(memorandum to the Prime Minister, on file in Arctic Islands Report on Sovereignty,

Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa).
21. Id.
22. Royal Canadian Mounted Police posts, with the date of their establishment, were:
Pond Inlet, Baffin Island, 1921; Craig Harbour, Ellesmere Island, 1922; Dundas Harbour,
Devon Island, 1924; Kane Basin, Ellesmere Island, 1924; Bache Peninsula, Ellesmere Island,
1926; Craig Harbour closed 1927 and reopened 1933; Bache Peninsula dosed 1933; Dundas
Harbour closed 1933 and reopened 1945; Resolute Bay Detachment on Cornwallis Island
established at the joint Canadian-United States weather station, 1947. See Royal Canadian
Mounted Police, Canadian Sovereignty in the Arctic (undated mimeographed article on
file in Royal Canadian Mounted Police Public Relations Dep't Ottawa).
23. Cf. P. BAIRD, THE POLAR WORLD 173 (1964); W. RIDDELL, DOCUMENTS ON CANADIAN
FOREIGN POLICY, 1917-1939, at 743 (1962).
24. Clipperton Island case (Mexico and France), 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 390 (1932).
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dispute between Mexico and France. Mexico contended that, as successor to
Spain, she had a right to the island, which was discovered by early Spanish
navigators. 25 Although the Mexicans produced charts allegedly showing the
island to be under Spanish sovereignty, it was found that they lacked official
character and had little evidentiary value. 26 Mexico had, moreover, performed
no positive acts manifesting "dominion" over the island until the controversy
actually arose. France, on the other hand, had, in November 1858, claimed
the island through a symbolic act of annexation performed by a visiting naval
officer, and duly publicized to the world in an official decree. 27 Napoleon III
thereafter granted a concession to one of his subjects to exploit guano beds
on the island, but without any result. At the end of the century some American nationals collected guano on Clipperton without explicit authorization,
but when France made inquiries the United States disavowed any interest in
claiming the territory. Soon thereafter, the Mexican Navy ejected the intruders and hoisted the Mexican flag over the island. On learning of the
adverse claim, France protested and the matter was referred, finally, to Victor
Emmanuele III, as arbitrator. He decided that in 1858 the island was terra
nullius and that its symbolic annexation by France in that year, given the
2
absence of rival claims, yielded a good title. 8
In the context of the Canadian Arctic, the question is whether similar
symbolic acts, by Canada or other nations, would constitute an adequate
ground to sovereignty. Although many of the islands of the Arctic Archipelago are larger in size than Clipperton, many of them also are destitute of
permanent population and acts of symbolic annexation have been performed
29
in respect to them in the past by explorers from various countries.
The Palmas case3" decided by Judge Huber in 1928 comprises the locus
classicus of the doctrine of "effective occupation" as it relates to territorial
claims over unoccupied territory. This dispute between the United States and
the Netherlands originated in 1906 when General Leonard Wood, Governor
of the Philippine Province of Moro, visited the island on a tour of inspection.
Palmas (or Miangas) was a tiny, isolated island roughly midway between
Mindanao, the southernmost island of the Philippine Archipelago, and the
nearest part of the Netherlands East Indies. The United States claimed title
to Palmas as cessionary of Spain under the Treaty of Paris of 1898, which
ended the Spanish-American War and ceded the Philippines, along with
other territories, to the United States. The American argument was essen-

25. Id. at 393.
26. id.

27. Id.
28. Id.
29. E.g., by the Canadian Bernier, the American MacMillan and the Norwegian
Sverdrup. See Smith, Sovereignty in the North: The Canadian Aspect of an International
Problem, in THE Azcare FRoNrIE 205-07 (R. Macdonald ed. 1966); P. BAIRD, supra note 23,

at 170-71.
30. Island of Palmas Case (United States and the Netherlands), April 4, 1928, see 22
AM. J. INT'L L. 867 (1928) for the text of the decision.
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tially that the island had been discovered by Spain and that it was a contiguous part of the Philippine Archipelago. Spanish title had, moreover, been
recognized in the Treaty of Munster of 1648, to which both Spain and the
Netherlands were signatories, and in subsequent treaties.3 1 The Dutch, conversely, were able to show that, with some inconsequential interruptions, they
had administered the island since 1677 through the Dutch East India Company, contracting with other sovereigns with respect to it, issuing their own
local currency that served as legal tender, suppressing prostitution, piracy,
and the slave trade within its boundaries, and engaging in a varied range
of administrative activities with respect to both its internal and external
affairs.
In his decision, Huber resorted to a private law analogy, giving paramount
force to what he termed the prescriptive title of the Netherlands over
Palmas. 32 The Dutch had manifested a lengthy, continuous, and peaceful
(or unopposed) display of governmental authority over the island, while
American title, if it were to be found, rested on the more brittle basis of
discovery or contiguity, which yielded only an inchoate title never subsequently perfected by official acts demonstrating "effective occupation." There
might, indeed, be sporadic gaps in Dutch administration over the course of
centuries as long as such gaps did not constitute abandonment. There was
no question that in 1898, the date of the Spanish cession to the United States,
33
Palmas was under Dutch sovereignty.
34
The judgment of the World Court in the Eastern Greenland case followed the award in the Palmas arbitration 35 by some five years and relaxed
Huber's more rigorous requirements to establish sovereignty in regions where
inhospitable Arctic climates made human habitation and ordinary pursuits
difficult. What was appropriate in the Tropics, in other words, might not be
appropriate at the Poles. The problem may be stated briefly: How could one
show "effective occupation" or animus dominendi in areas where all normal
pursuits were precluded by glacial terrain and sub-zero temperatures?
The Eastern Greenland dispute arose when, on June 28, 1931, five Arctic
skippers from Norway hoisted their national ensign over the northeastern
coast of Greenland. By this symbolic act they purported to take possession, in
the name of Haakon VII of Norway, of a 350-mile long expanse of coast from
Carlsberg Fjord in the south to Bessel Fjord in the north, an area visited
continually by Norwegian skippers and in which they had built a large number of huts for shelter on their fishing expeditions. It was impracticable to
delimit the exact dimensions of the Norwegian claim, since the whole interior
of the island was overlaid by a massive mile-thick glacier and the only area
of any practical usefulness was the irregularly indented coast that provided
safe harbors for wayfaring fishermen.

31. Id. at 879.
32. Id. at 908-09.

33. Island of Palmas Case, April 4, 1928, see 22 AM. J. INT'L L. 861, 908-10 (1928).
84. Eastern Greenland Case [1933] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 58, at 22.
35. Island of Palmas Case, April 4, 1928, see 22 AM. J. INT'L L. 867, 912 (1928).
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The Danes, who were first advised of the unofficial claim by Oslo newspapers, were surprised by the Norse annexation, whereas opinion in Norway
on the gesture was sharply divided. Both governments had agreed by the
Oslo Convention of 192430 to extend rights to fishermen and hunters of either
country along the eastern coast of the island. On July 10, 1931, however, a
definitive claim was made by Norway to the northeastern area, with Denmark
immediately announcing her intention to submit the matter to the World
Court at the Hague. Norway contended that the disputed area had hitherto
been a terra nullius subject to appropriation by whomever exercised effective
control over it, and that Danish activities were confined to the southwest coast
and a few scattered settlements.3 7 The Norwegians, rather opportunely, invested two of their nationals traveling to the area with police powers and,
probably as a countermeasure, the Danes commissioned one of their leading
explorers, Lauge Koch, to survey the coast and installed him with a similar
capacity. In an opera bouffe aftermath, the Icelandic Parliament on August
20 voted 26-0 to empower their cabinet to "take care of Iceland's rights in
Greenland" in pending arrangements between Denmark and Norway at the
Hague. 38
On July 28, 1932, the World Court began hearing the dispute. Appointed
as judges ad hoc3 9 were the Norwegian Minister in London and the Danish
Minister in Berlin. Unfortunately, the appointment of diplomatic envoys
as judges by either state may not have been conducive to the promotion of
an impartial adjudication into the merits of the case. In its decision the court
found it inappropriate to apply modern terminology such as "territorial sovereiguty" to the context of Greenland in medieval times. 0 Assuredly, in the
tenth century intrepid Norsemen such as Eric the Red had founded Nordic

36. Oslo Convention No. 684, 27 L.N.T.S. at 203 (1924).
37. This issue was referred to in an exchange of letters in The Times (London),
which closely reflected the views of the disputant countries. For Norway, H. K. Lehmkuhl
asserted that according to the 1924 Olso Convention the question of sovereignty over the
area was to be left in abeyance for 20 years during which time hunters and fishermen from
each country were to enjoy free access to the area. However, if the matter had been shelved
in theory it obtruded itself in practice and Norway had now sought to resolve it permanently by making a definitive claim. See The Times (London) Aug. 5, 1931, at 6, col. 3.
For the Danes, P. T. Federspiel retorted that the question of sovereignty nowhere arose
in the 1924 Convention but in a simultaneous exchange of notes appended to the Convention as a protocol it was stated that the Convention would prejudice neither party on
questions not dealt with in the text. Federspiel added that repeated efforts by Norway to
reopen the sovereignty issue had been repulsed by the Danes who contended there was
nothing to discuss, since Danish sovereignty over Greenland had been recognized by the
United States in 1916, by France, Great Britain, Italy, and Japan in 1920, and by a number
of other states in subsequent years. See The Times (London) Aug. 7, 1931, at 6, col. 4.
38. The Times (London) Aug. 21, 1931, at 12, col. 6.
39. As is often the case with judges ad hoc (judges appointed to the World Court by
disputants to adjudicate a particular case when there is nobody on the bench of their
nationality) the Norwegian judge found for Norway and the Dane decided for Denmark.
See Eastern Greenland Case [1933] P.C.I.J. ser. A/B, No. 53, at 75.
40. Id. at 46.
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colonies on the northeast coast, but it was most unlikely that the early Norse
settlers distinguished clearly between territory subject and not subject to their
control; there was, simply, no refined or precise concept of territorial sovereignty as it later developed. The fact, however, that in the thirteenth century fines were payable to the King of Norway for murders committed in
Greenland "as far north as the Pole Star" (not merely within the precincts
of the two existing Norse settlements of Eystribygd and Vestribygd) disclosed
the Norwegian King's intention to govern the entire area.41 Indeed in the
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, Norway's rights in Greenland did amount
to sovereignty. Thereafter, either through the rigours of the climate and
economic circumstances or war with the Eskimos, the exact facts are unknown,
the Norse settlements perished. After a considerable interval, expeditions were
sent out again, especially in the early eighteenth century, and settlement was
resumed.
The court found that prior to 1814, the King of Denmark and Norway
(the Crowns were united since 1397) exercised rights over Greenland as King
of Norway, but by the Treaty of Kiel of 1814, which united Norway and
Sweden, the Danish King asserted sovereignty over Greenland. 42 The Norwegians, consequently, had to argue either that their own title prior to 1814
was defective or that the term "Greenland" did not comprise the settlements
on the East Coast; they argued strongly, in fact, in favor of the latter contention. The Norwegian contention was that, since the Eastern Coastal region
was unknown in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the term as used
in various ordinances and decrees should be construed as not extending to
that region.43 The tribunal disagreed, since an examination of charts of the
period showed that cartographers and mariners were aware of the general
configuration, if not specific details, of the coast, and that whalers had visited
the region and given names to prominent land features.- The term "Greenland" was commonly used with reference to both coasts, in fact, and referred
not merely to a few isolated Danish settlements but to the whole island.45
Especially persuasive to the court was the consideration that:46
[B]earing in mind the absence of any claim to sovereignty by another
Power, and the Arctic and inaccessible character of the uncolonized
parts of the country, the King of Denmark and Norway . ...displayed
authority to an extent sufficient to give his country a valid claim to
sovereignty, and that his rights were not limited to the colonized area.
Sovereign authority was shown partly by early laws purporting to extend to
the whole of Greenland. "Legislation is one of the most obvious forms of the

41. Id. at 27.

42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 30.
Id. at 51.
Id. at 50.
Cf. the "literal" mode of interpretation of statutes much invoked by common

lawyers.

46. Eastern Greenland Case, [1933] P.C.I.J. ser. A/B, No. 53, at 57.
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exercise of sovereign power, and it is dear that the operation of these enactments was not restricted to the limits of the colonies." 4 7 Also important was
apparent Norwegian acquiescence in the Danish title as manifested by the
Ihen declaration of July 1919, by which the Norwegian foreign minister
advised the Danish envoy at Kristiana that Norway would not dispute Danish
sovereignty over Greenland. s This declaration against self-interest on the
part of a responsible government official was particularly damaging to the
Norwegian cause. The Norwegians argued that the declaration was made
without necessary royal authority, but the court was unimpressed.
Following the 12-241 opinion of the court in favor of Danish sovereignty,
the King of Denmark sent his brother the King of Norway a telegram stating
that he understood the disappointment of the Norwegian people, but that
he entertained the hope of continued good relations between the two Nordic
peoples, and prayers were offered by Danish and Norwegian bishops for the
dissipation of any bitterness arising from the dispute.50
In yet another case concerning the ownership of barren, unpopulated,
undemarcated territory, the Privy Council applied the "hinterland" test and
found, on the basis of an examination of a number of Royal Grants and
other instruments, that ownership of the "Coast" of the Labrador, in the
absence of anything more definitive, carried with it title to the watershed or
the drainage basins of land drained by the river systems "falling into the sea
at that place."5 1 As a result of this case, Newfoundland secured many thousands of square miles of territory formerly regarded as belonging to Quebec.
The decision inspired much ire in official circles in the latter province, particularly since at the date of the decision Newfoundland was not a part of
Canada.5 2 It is noteworthy that title to much of the Canadian Arctic, especially as it derives from the Hudson Bay Company's patent to Rupert's
Land, also appears to hinge on this "hinterland" or "drainage basin" principle, which was commonly employed in the colonial era to define political
boundaries of the interiors of coastlines in remote, inaccessible regions.5 3
The foregoing cases all concern title to land territory of a description
that could apply in the Arctic. Although there has been less international
litigation on the ownership of the adjacent seabed, the recent North Sea Continental Shelf cases-s suggest how future disputes on underwater terrain might

47. Id. at 49.
48.

Id. at 57-58.

49. Actually, Judge Anzilotti who disagreed with the reasoning of the majority opinion
concurred in the result so that the only real dissident was the Norwegian ad hoc judge.
50. The Times (London) April 6, 1933, at 13, col 4.
51. Re the Labrador Boundary, 43 T.L.R. 289, 294 (1927).
52. See the criticism of the decision from a geographical point of view in HENRi
DomoN, LA FRONTERE QUEmc-TERRENEUVE (1963).
53. For a discussion of the colonial origin of the hinterland doctrine, see M. LINDLEY, THE ACQUISITION

AND GOVERNMENT

OF BACKwARD

TERRIToRy IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

234-35 (1926).
54. North Sea Continental Shelf Case, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 591 (1969).
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be resolved. The law in this area is of recent origin, dating from President
Truman's celebrated proclamation of 1945 claiming rights in the continental
shelf appurtenant to the United States. 55 Since that time there have been
many similar claims and an international convention56 on the subject has
come into operationY.The North Sea dispute5 s arose when the Netherlands and Denmark
sought to have the equidistance principle 59 applied to delimit their respective shares of the North Sea continental shelf vis-a-vis West Germany. If this
were done, because of their convex, bulging coasts and the concave or recessing
German coastline wedged between them, their shares of the shelf would be
considerably enhanced at German expense. The Germans who, unlike the
Danes or the Dutch, had signed but not yet ratified the convention,60 argued
that the equidistance principle, although referred to in the convention, was
not a customary rule of international law and was therefore not binding upon
parties not ratifying the convention.6x They suggested that a more equitable
solution would be to extend the respective underwater boundaries out into
the shallow waters of the North Sea to the median line demarcating the shelf
boundaries of the three disputants and the United Kingdom, thus allocating
a somewhat larger pie-shaped wedge to Germany.
The court held that the equidistance principle was merely one of several
possible modes of demarcating underwater boundaries and lacked the character
of international customary law. 6 2 Instead of the mathematical concept of
equidistance, it employed the geographical concept of the natural underwater
extension or "prolongation" of the claimant state's land territory.6 3 Since
the decision might, by analogy,6 4 be applied to the intricate contours of various
Arctic continental shelves, it would be useful to quote the relevant part of the
judgment:65

55.
56.

Presidential Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (1945).
See Convention on the Continental Shelf, April 28, 1958, [1958] 15 U.S.T. 471,

T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 450 U.N.T.S. 311.

57. The Convention came into effect on June 10, 1964, when the 22 ratifications or
accessions required for that purpose by article II had been received. See North Sea Continental Shelf Case, 63 Ai. J. INT'L L. at 605 (1969).
58. North Sea Continental Shelf Case, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 591 (1969).
59. An "equidistance" boundary line was defined as a line, "which leaves to each of
the parties concerned all those portions of the continental shelf that are nearer to a point
on its own coast than they are to any point on the coast of the other party." Id. at 597.
60. Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 56.
61. North Sea Continental Shelf Case, 63 Af. J. INT'L L. at 601 (1969).
62. Id. at 631.
63. Id.
64. Strictly speaking a decision by the International Court of Justice is not a precedent
although it may be a highly persuasive authority in a subsequent dispute. See art. 59 of
the Statute of the Court: "The decision of the Court has no binding force except between
the parties and in respect of that particular case."
65. North Sea Continental Shelf Case, 63 Am. J. INT'L L. at 610-11 (1969).
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What confers the ipso jure title which international law attributes to
the Coastal State in respect of its continental shelf, is the fact that the
submarine areas concerned may be deemed to be actually part of the
territory over which the coastal state already has dominion,--in the
sense, that, although covered with water, they are a prolongation or
continuation of that territory, an extension of it under the sea. From
this it would follow that whenever a given submarine area does not
constitute a natural-or the most natural-extension of the land territory of the coastal state, even though that territory may be closer to
it than it is to the territory of any other state, it cannot be so regarded
in the face of a competing claim by a state of whose land territory
the submarine area concerned is to be regarded as a natural extension,
even if it is less dose to it.
Accordingly, the court advised the parties to negotiate a solution not on the
basis of "equidistance" but taking into account the principle of "natural
prolongation" and to divide the territory either in agreed proportions or
equally in cases of overlap. In applying this test, such factors as the general
configuration of the coasts, physical and geological structures, natural resources, and "a reasonable degree of proportionality" (in relation to the
length of the coast measured in the general direction of the coastline) should
also be considered.66
THE SECTOR PRINCIPLE

Because of the rigors of the climate, the lack of a settled population and
the desolation of the frozen surface, the methods of apportioning sovereignty
over territory, that are suited to other latitudes, have not proved satisfactory
in establishing Polar boundaries. The Arctic is comprised largely of vast
expanses of permanent or pack ice, while the Antarctic Continent, a region
allowing scant evaporation, is buried under annual accretions of snow consolidating into successive icy layers. There are, at either Pole, few of the
topographical features often used in temperate zones for frontiers, and resort
must be made to a more geometrical method of claiming territory. Despite
the differences in physical forms between the Arctic and the Antarctic, claims
have been made to territory by superimposing imaginary spherical triangles
over large areas with the lateral boundaries converging at the respective poles.
Such a method of claiming territory is far from universally accepted,67 espedally by states physically distant from the Arctic or Antarctic, or by those
with narrow littorals from the extremities of which the sector boundaries
are measured.
In 1925 when the pace of Arctic exploration was accelerating and
apprehension arose in Canada of possible rival claims in the Arctic, the

66. Id. at 631.
67. Some states with Arctic shorelines, such as the United States and Norway, have

expressly repudiated the sector principle. For the American position, see 2 M. WMnmAN,
INTERNATMONAL LAW 1268 (1963), and for the Norwegian stance see 1 G. HACxwoRTH, supra

note 5, at 465.
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Canadian Minister of the Interior tabled a map in the House of Commons
laying claim to all land "discovered or yet to be discovered" between the
meridians of 60 degrees and 141 degrees west longitude. 68 In the following
year the U.S.S.R. inscribed sector boundaries in the Arctic situated between
the meridian of east longitude 320 4' 35" and the meridian of west longitude
1680 49' 30", again intersecting at the North PoleA9 Within the space of a
year Canada and the U.S.S.R. became, and have remained, the only states
with Arctic shorelines to enunciate sector claims, and the absence of such
claims by other states with Arctic coasts or possessions has tended to diminish
whatever credibility such claims may possess.
There is a certain vagueness, moreover, in the content of the Soviet and
Canadian sector claims, which reflects adversely on their general acceptability
as grounds of title. Does the sector principle, in either its Soviet or Canadian
expression, purport to appropriate permanent or pack ice within sector
boundaries? Does it bear any relevance to the seabed or continental shelf?
Could Canada, under the North Sea case°7 0 claim a portion of the submarine
shelf in the Soviet sector because such portion was a natural prolongation
of its land territory, and that the sector principle, which referred only to
islands or to ice, did not apply? Are there any maritime rights incidental to
sector claims, or are they merely a means of appropriating stable territory of
an insular, glacial, or submarine character? Would it be permissible, for
instance, for a state lodging a sector claim to purport to regulate the movement of foreign vessels, public or private, entering its sector? On the basis of
reciprocity, should those states making sector claims recognize sector rights
of other Arctic states, such as the United States or Norway, who do not formally make or recognize such claims? That these questions are not purely
abstract academic issues is disclosed by some of the discussion on the sector
principle.
In expounding the Soviet Arctic sector claim in 1930, the Russian jurist
Laklhtine argued that in view of the impossibility of perfecting a claim to
Arctic sovereignty on the traditional basis of discovery, occupation, and
notification ("effective occupation") there should be substituted for this
"triple formula" "the doctrine of the region of attraction." 7 1 Stated simply,
the doctrine signifies that "lands and islands being still undiscovered are
already presumed to belong to the national territory of the adjacent Polar
72
state in the sector of the region of attraction in which they are to be found."
Lakhtine also argued that "floating ice" was assimilable to open polar seas
and not subject to national appropriation, but that "immovable ice" within
sector boundries "should enjoy a legal status equivalent to polar territory."73

68. PA ,U. DEB., H. C. 4084 (1925) (Canada) [hereinafter cited as DEB. H.C.].
69. Decree of the Central Presidium of the Central Executive Comm., U.S.S.R., April 15,
1926, cited in 2 M.

70.
71.
72.
73.

"WTHITEMAN,

INTERNATIONAL

LAW 1268 (1963).

See text accompanying notes 54-56 supra.
Lakhine, Rights over the Arctic, 24 AM. J. INT'L L. 711 (1930).
Id.
Id. at 712.
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The statements of different Canadian Prime Ministers and cabinet ministers in relation to the country's Arctic claims have not always been consistent. In making the Canadian sector claim in 1925, Interior Minister
Stewart made no reference to "ice" and presumably the Canadian claim,
at least as he framed it, would not embrace it. 4 Jean Lesage and Alvin
Hamilton, as successive incumbents of the portfolio having jurisdiction over
the Arctic, were not in full agreement about the applicability of the Canadian
sector claim to the ice. In 1956 Lesage said in Parliament, "We have never
subscribed to the sector theory in relation to the ice,""6 but only two years
later Hamilton left the issue more or less open. He stated: "[rMhe Arctic
Ocean north of the archipelago is not open water nor has it the stable
qualities of land. Consequently the ordinary rules of international law may
or may not have application."76 The late Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson,
while he was Canadian Ambassador to the United States in 1946, asserted
that Canadian sovereignty extended to "the islands and the frozen sea north
of the mainland between the meridians of its east and west boundaries [extending] to the North Pole."7 7 And some twenty-three years later, in 1969,
just after his retirement as Prime Minister, he contended that the sector
principle would embrace title to "permanent ice," but not to "pack ice,"
which lacked the stable and durable characteristics of the former. 78 Prime
Minister St. Laurent, ex abundantiacautela, appeared to place Canadian title
to Arctic territory both on the basis of effective occupation and the sector
principle. In 1953, in the House, he said: "We must leave no doubt about
our active occupation and exercise of our sovereignty in these lands right up
to the Pole." 79 In more recent times, former Prime Minister John Diefenbaker
has suggested that the principle could apply to "waterways" as well as islands,
thereby enabling Canada, possibly, to control the use of channels by vessels
plying through the Archipelago.8 0 Prime Minister Trudeau, however, has
disagreed, applying the principle to "the seabed and shelf,"8' which certainly
were not embraced in the 1925 claim, and apparently had not before been
mentioned as falling within the purview of the sector principle.
Originally framed by Canada and the U.S.S.R. to forestall unacceptable
rival claims to territory in their respective sectors, the sector principle has
never had wide currency nor rigorously specific content, as revealed in the
often confused glosses on it in the Canadian Parliament. There is, moreover,
considerable doubt as to whether the principle is of much real assistance
either to Canada or the U.S.S.R. in supporting their respective Arctic claims.

74. P.aRL. DEB., H.C. 4069, 4083-86 (1925); H.C. DEB. 6955 (1956).
75. DEB. H.C. 1559 (1957-1958).
76. Id.
77. Pearson, Canada Looks Down North, 24 FOREIGN APAmS 638 (1945-1946).
78. Televised interview with Lester B. Pearson, former Prime Minister of Canada,
Nov. 9, 1969.
79. D.B. H.C. 700 (1953-1954).
80. Dn. H.C. 6396 (1969).
81. D.B. H. C. 6396 (1969).
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Except with possible reference to permanent ice there is no serious dispute
to title by others, and it is highly unlikely, in the light of extensive explorations, whether there remain any "undiscovered islands" to which the principle
would apply. Better grounds of title than the sector principle seem available.
Technological advances have made a form of occupation or control possible.
Given the nature of the region, the establishment of a wide spectrum of
governmental, police, military, meteorological, scientific, and commercial
enterprises in the Arctic, coupled with the acquiescence of the international
community to claims to particular islands or island groups, tend to manifest
such occupation or control.
A problem that makes it difficult to apply the sector principle in the
Antarctic consists in the lack of an adjacent land mass under the sovereignty
of several of the claimant states, such as France or Norway,8 2 precluding the
extension of meridians of longitude southwards to the Pole from contiguous
national territory. In such cases an area of lodgment along the coast, usually
a tract explored by the claimant state, serves as a substitute for such national
territory. An example is the slender wedge of French Antarctic territory
known as Adelie Land, which was discovered by Jules Dumont d'Urville in
1840 and named for his wife Adele. D'Urville made only a sighting of the
bleak, desolate territory-which has average wind velocities of about fifty
miles per hour-and no definitive French claim to Terre Adelie was made
until 1924.3 It was only in 1951 that the French territory became the site of
the first human settlement in all Antarctica.
Because of the absence of contiguous national territory, or alternatively, of
a natural tableland extension, which might confer a degree of geographical
legitimacy on sector claims,14 controversies have sometimes erupted between
claimants with mutually conflicting, or overlapping, sector claims in the
Antarctic. For example, the sector claims of Argentina, Chile, and Great
Britain in the Antarctic conflict. Great Britain supports her claim by projecting meridians of longitude southwards from the Falklands. s 5 Yet the Falklands are also claimed by the Argentines who know them as the Malvinas and
who were ejected from them by the British early in the nineteenth century.

82. Norway, it should be noted, has expressly rejected the sector principle as it applies
in the Arctic. See note 67 supra.
83. Svarlien, The Sector Principle in Law and Practice, 10 POLAR REcORD 252 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as Svarlien].
84. Svarlien argues that the initial Russian sector claim was actually made in 1916
when the Russian ambassador to the United States advised the State Department of the
annexation of several Arctic Islands in "the northern continuation of the Siberian continental shelf." It would seem, however, that such a title would rest on "continuity" or
the geographical extension of the continental tableland, whereas the sector principle, more
properly, would reflect "contiguity" or the nearness of the claimant state to the Arctic,

whether or not its tableland in fact ever reached the Pole, which is the culminating point
of all sector claims. Id. at 254.
85. Waldock, Disputed Sovereignty in the Falkland Islands Dependencies, 25 BUr. Y.B.
INT'L L. 311, 328 (1948).
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Since Argentina challenges the legitimacy of Britain's title to the Falklands,
it also disputes the sector claim based upon it.8
The position of the United States has consistently been that it would
neither claim territory for itself nor recognize any other territorial claims in
Antarctica. 7 American explorers like Admiral Richard E. Byrd and Lincoln Ellsworth, however, have led expeditions to the Continent that have
sometimes created anxieties among other states that the United States would
lodge her own competing claims to Antarctic territory. Prompted by such a
fear on the occasion of Byrd's 1946 expedition, the Argentines established
a new meteorological observatory near the route of the expedition through
the Argentine sector. They feared that an American claim, along with the
existing British and Chilean claims, in addition to their own, would have
made matters incredibly complex. The American State Department, however,
later advised the British Ambassador in Washington that the hoisting of
Old Glory by one of Byrd's subordinates at Marguerite Bay did not constitute a claim to American sovereignty in the British sector, since the United
8s
States neither made nor acknowledged such claims in the Antarctic.
In view of Admiral Byrd's extensive explorations on this occasion, involving the discovery and mapping of 310,000 square miles of Antarctic territory
previously unseen, and a further 535,000 square miles of which probably
fifteen per cent had not been visited before s 9 one wonders if he might not
have been seeking to preclude an inchoate title from being established in
favor of other states on the basis of discovery.90 Was he not, it might be
asked, furthering American policy by engaging in a kind of preemptive
discovery to prevent the undesirable proliferation of Antarctic sector claims
by others, thereby possibly laying the basis for some kind of Antarctic condominium? 91

Although the Antarctic claims advanced by the respective sector claimants
have not been eliminated, the signatories of the Antarctic Treaty of 1959,92
of which the United States was the principal sponsor, have agreed, pending
the duration of the treaty, to suspend further territorial claims or disputes,
and to cooperate so that "Antarctica shall continue forever to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not become the scene or object of

86. See 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 117 (1947) and Supplement at 11, for details of the Argentine claim. See also Waldock, Disputed Sovereignty in the Falkland Islands Dependencies,
25 BRr. Y.B. INT'L L. 311 (1948).
87. See the statement to that effect made on Dec. 27, 1946, by Dean Acheson while he
was Acting Secretary of State. The Times (London) Dec. 28, 1946, at 4, col. 3.
88. The Times (London), March 22, 1947, at 4, col. 5.
89. Id. March 10, 1947, at 3, col. 5.
90. See text accompanying notes 23-35 supra.
91. Cf. the ANTARcan TREATY, 1959, by which the signatories agreed not to press territorial claims for a thirty-year period and established a kind of cooperative regime over the
whole Continent. See Hayton, The Antarctic Settlement of 1959, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 349

(1960).
92.

[1959] 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71.
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international discord."'9 3 The new cooperative approach emphasizes the
mutuality of interest among the signatories in fostering scientific research
and exploration in the various sectors of the Continent, with each part)
enjoying full rights and undertaking not to test weapons or establish military
94
bases anywhere in the area.

A

CLAIM TO ARCTIC ICE?

Quite apart from the sector principle there remains the question of
whether, as Prime Minister Pearson had on occasion suggested, Canada or
other Arctic states could assert title to permanent ice adjacent to their
national boundaries. The vexed issue of national title to glacies firma has
been the subject of protracted and inconclusive dispute among international
jurists. As eminent an authority as Sir Hersch Lauterpacht has argued emphatically that sovereignty over polar ice is not acceptable: 95
When in 1909, Admiral Peary reached the North Pole and hoisted
the flag of the United States, the question was discussed whether the
North Pole could be the object of occupation. The question must, it is
believed, be answered in the negative since there is no land at the North
Pole.
With the increasing disposition of states to claim submarine rights in the
continental shelf, extensive contiguous maritime belts, and territorial seas,
one might question whether Lauterpacht's explicit limitation of international
ownership to land is as persuasive as it once was. Is title through occupation
confined to land, or, indeed, is it necessary at all to occupy ice in order to
put forward a valid claim to it?
The American, Scott, 96 and the Canadian, Clute, 97 are in firm agreement
with Lauterpacht that ice is not subject to national appropriation. Balch
assumes an intermediate position, contending that North polar ice is not
subject to ownership, since it is in continual motion, but he does not discount
the possibility of immobile ice being effectively occupied.98 Other jurists have
argued that claims to sovereignty over some forms of ice are permissible.99
That the solution to this dilemma is not to be found in the simple dichotomy
between "land" and "sea" (or "frozen sea") put forward, for instance, by
Lauterpachtoo or Colombos-°1 may be inferred from the following description
of Antarctica:102
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Preamble, Antarctic Treaty of 1959, note 92 supra.
Id.
L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 556 (8th ed. 1955).
3 AM. J. INT'L L. 938 (1909).
5 CAN. B. REv. 21 (1927).
4 AM. J. INT'L L. 265-66 (1910).
99. See 2 M. WHITEMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1266 (1963).
100.
101.
102.

See L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 95, at 508 n.6.
C. COLOMBOS, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 129 (6th ed. 1967).
See Hayton, supra note 91, at 360.
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A more or less land-locked ice cap in firm union with the bedrock beneath is, because of its origin, probably made up chiefly of frozen fresh
water, or compressed and transformed snow, not frozen salt water. For
all practical purposes it is perpetually solid as the land it "sits on."
What industries or actions of the high seas can be exercised on or in
such a medium. Whether certain portions of Antarctica are shown to
be only islands bound together by solid ice or land depressed by the
great weight of ice, it would seem proper to modify the concept of
territory to accommodate such "glades firma."
Especially if one accepts the hypothesis mentioned by Hayton that Antarctica is actually a number of island entities exhibiting merely a superficial
unity because of the dense overlying ice cap,10 3 the feasibility of acquiring
property rights in such ice would be enhanced. What would be the difference,
in such circumstances, between appropriating glacies firma over frozen seabed
(which is what the Arctic sector claimants have really done) or glacies firma
over land? In chemical composition and in almost every conceivable characteristic and use, there would be no distinction in the overlying ice except
with respect to what was situated beneath. One might ask, as well, what the
difference would be between interstitial ice linking together the various
hypothetical islands of Antarctica and ice overhanging the sea (ice shelves)
along the fringes of the Antarctic Continent? The possibilities of exploiting
the surface of the ice over the sea would be virtually identical with the
possibilities of exploiting ice in the interior over land. Indeed, if exploitability and habitability or durability and permanence are among the prerequisites for appropriating a global surface, one would find it difficult to
make a valid distinction between such ice and land. The permanent ice at
the North Pole exhibits essentially the same properties.
At both poles, the geological effects of compression over many centuries
coupled with a negligible rate of evaporation have produced a solid mass of
material that, for many purposes, can be assimilated to land and on which
permanent structures can be built with an expectation of stability over protracted periods. Even the ice shelves at both poles are not actually products
of the sea, but accretions of atmospheric and terrestrial forces. For instance,
the Ross Ice Shelf at Little America is said to consist of 1,200 years accumulated snow pressed by its own weight into plastic ever-spreading ice.' 0 ' Baird
speculates that the very thick and almost stationary Ellesmere Island ice shelf
in the Arctic Archipelago, from which most Atlantic ice islands originate,
must have formed in situ over the space of several thousand years.-0
An appreciation of the origin of ice shelves might, consequently, prompt
a reconsideration of some of the theories put forward by maritime lawyers

103. For a discussion, to similar effect, of the Greenland ice sheet, see J.

SATER, TnE

Aicnc BASIN 10-11 (1969).

104. 'See BAIm, supra note 2,
105. Id. at 69.

at 282.
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concerning the appropriate limits of the territorial sea in polar areas. Colombos, for example, argues: 106
The question has often been raised as to whether, in case the sea is
frozen, the sovereignty of the riparian state extends to the limits of
the ice forming a continuous pack from the shore, without taking into
consideration the normal limits of the territorial sea. To admit the
affirmative absolutely is to give to states, especially in the polar regions,
an excessive maritime belt as ice pack may assume immense proportions.
Without attempting to refute conclusively what Colombos says, one might
ask whether his conclusion would be the same if he considered that the ice
shelves at the edges of polar ice caps were not, in fact, "frozen seas," but
accumulated snow, subject to very little seasonal evaporation and hardening
into layers through pressure over great periods of time. It also could make
a difference in his conclusion if a state were delimiting its offshore boundaries
from a relatively durable, stable accretion of tremendous density and compactness, formed wholly on land and only subsequently moving out to sea.
If one took an ice shelf of such composition extending, as is not uncommon,
twenty miles out to sea, the leading edge of which advanced very slowly,
forming icebergs, with any seaward loss being made up by the movement of
other ice from the interior, the whole ice formation would have a relatively
stable and unitary aspect. One would be dealing here with an ice shelf hundreds of feet thick, of great density, and often many miles in linear dimension
from the nearest land surface. When all these geographical facts are considered, it is suggested that one could make a persuasive argument that the
territorial sea and contiguous zones appurtenant to an Arctic coast should
be delimited from prominent ice shelves. If Colombos' argument were
adopted, there would often be great practical and navigational difficulties
in delimiting them from a seacoast buried under huge icecaps. Indeed, where
the length of the icecap was greater than that of territorial waters, there
would be no territorial waters discernible.
THE LEGAL

STATUS OF

ARCTIC

WATERS

The recent dispute between the United States and Canada concerned,
principally, the problem of pollution in Arctic waters. The most important
subsidiary issue concerned the legal character of the waters of the broad
corridor wending through the islands. If this broad corridor was an arm of
the high seas linking two of the world's major oceans, vessels of all nations,
fitted with modern ice-breaking equipment, might eventually ply through
it, or mammoth 175,000 ton submarine tankers could navigate underneath its
dense pack ice thereby saving time 107 and money and avoiding burdensome

106.
107.
miles.

C. COLOMBOS, supra note 101, at 129.
This route diminishes the water distance between New York and Tokyo by 8,320
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restrictions imposed by the coastal state. Accordingly, it would be crucial
for all of the important maritime states to ascertain the exact legal status
of the intricate channels between the archipelagic islands.
There has been a constant disposition on the part of nations with large
merchant and naval fleets to assert the principle of "freedom of the seas,"
when faced with possible encroachments, in the interest of untrammeled
maritime communications. The great sea powers-Great Britain, the United
States, the Soviet Union, France, and Japan-have consistently argued against
a plethora of administrative regulations by littoral states that could, for
instance, close off important straits or make navigation through coastal
waters unduly burdensome. Such nations have, consequently, tended to oppose
unilateral extensions of territorial waters stretching out for one or two hun08
dred miles from the coasts of Latin American states and such recent initiatives as the creation by Canada of a 100-mile buffer zone for the purpose of
preventing oil pollution in the Arctic in which tanker movements, especially,
are restricted.
This controversial Canadian legislation was enacted in 1970 and consisted
of two statutes. The first extended Canadian territorial waters from three to
twelve miles in breadth. 09 Particularly, since such waters radiate even from
small, barren islands in mid-channel," 0 parts of the Arctic Ocean corridor
were entirely closed off. The other act purports to regulate the structure,
equipment, and itineraries of vessels plying within a one-hundred mile radius
of the Archipelago,"' thereby legally constructing a great aquatic arc extending over what had hitherto been regarded by everyone, without question, as
the high seas. Although many states had enacted similar or more sweeping
laws relating to territorial waters, the unilateral creation of such a large
anti-oil-pollution zone in the Arctic was unprecedented. Within a one-hundred mile circumference of the Archipelago the legislation asserts a right to
appoint inspectors and impose fines of up to 100,000 dollars per day against
12
owners whose ships dispose of "waste" in the prohibited zone. The severity

108. Cf., e.g., the arrest of certain of the vessels of the California tuna fleet off the
coast of Ecuador, arising from the latter's claim to a belt of territorial sea 200 miles in

width. The Christian Science Monitor, Feb. 19, 1970, at 2, col. 1.
109. See CAN. REv. STAT. ch. 45, §1 (1st Supp. 1970) amending the Territorial Sea and
Fishing Zones Act, ch. 1, §3, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. T-7 (1970), so that the total breadth of
the Canadian territorial sea would be 12 (instead of 3)nautical miles from the nearest
baseline, where a baseline system is in operation, or elsewhere 12 miles from the sinuosities
of the coast. The 1970 amendment removed all doubt that such relatively narrow archipelagic
channels as Prince of Wales Strait and Barrow Strait fell within Canadian territorial waters.
110. Cf. The King v. The Schooner John J. Fallon, 16 Can. Exch. 382 (1916), 55 Can.
S. Ct. 348 (1917); E1917J D.L.R. 659. This decision by the Supreme Court of Canada upheld
a criminal conviction of persons apprehended in the territorial waters of a small, craggy,

unoccupied island considerably removed from the mainland; the decision, moreover, would
appear to reflect the contemporary position in international law. See Convention on the
TerritorialSea and Contiguous Zone, supra note 4, art. 10(2).
111. The Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, CAN. RPv. STAT. c. 2 (1st Supp. 1970).

112. Id. §18(l).
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of the fine is said to be a necessary deterrent because of the gravity of the
ecological risk. It is important to note, however, that the act does not assert
sovereign rights within the anti-pollution zone, but merely a limited jurisdiction for the purpose of preventing disastrous oil spillages that could pollute
frigid arctic waters for long periods.
The act provides that from time to time specific "safety-control zones"
will be designated by executive orders, with access to such zones by vessels
being subject to conditions. 113 Among the conditions are rigid specifications
with respect to hull structure, the possession of navigational aids, specific
qualifications for personnel, and compliance with government directions concerning the time and route of passage.. 14 During certain seasons of the year,
or when hazardous ice conditions prevail, ships might be forbidden entirely
from entering such zones."l 1 Another requirement in the legislation is that
shipowners show evidence of financial responsibility adequate to cover possible pollution damage before being allowed to proceed through the Arctic.16
The legislation apparently created absolute liability, but in regulations promulgated in August 1972 several defenses became available to the proprietors
of vessels discharging waste." 7 In introducing the legislation Jean Chretien,
who is chiefly responsible for Arctic affairs in the federal cabinet, spoke of
the motives impelling the government to take unilateral action:"
Maritime law is evolving but more slowly than we would wish in
Canada. For centuries emphasis has been placed on the right of shipping to the use of the world's sea lanes without any regard to the
effect this might have on adjacent coastal states. While this may have
been practical before, now when millions of barrels of oil are afloat in
tankers on the high seas on any given day the threat of pollution is
real, and the interest of coastal states, as opposed to nations having
large commercial fleets, must be recognized. . . . At the World Shipping Conference in Brussels last year [1969] it was obvious that these
states continue to expect to have absolute priorities for their particular requirements. It became clear to the government of Canada that
unilateral action would have to be taken at this time if Canada was to
protect its own urgent interests.
The reaction of the United States Government to the legislation, and
especially to the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, was instant and

113. DEB. H.C. 5949-50, (1970) for implementing legislation see 1972 Canada Gazette
SI No. 72-76, Aug. 9, 1972 and SOR No. 72-303, Aug. 2, 1972 and SOR No. 72-292, July 28,
1972.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c. 2, §8 (1st Supp.
1970).
117. In regulations promulgated by the Governor-in-Council under delegated powers
on Aug. 2, 1972, defenses allowed to polluting vessels include "natural disasters" and "acts
of war," and liability is set at $135 per ton of total tonnage.
118. DEB. H.C. 5939 (1970).
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sharp. With its vast oil interests on Alaska's North Slope and plans under
way by private American firms to create an entire fleet of supertankers (of
which the Manhattan was a small-scale prototype), the United States Government was understandably concerned that passage through Arctic waters would
be impeded or possibly entirely cut off at certain times of the year. In a
press release dated April 15, 1970, the United States State Department contended that there was "no basis" in international law for "proposed unilateral
extensions of jurisdiction on the high seas" and deplored the Canadian resolve
not to submit the legality of the proposed anti-pollution zone to the International Court of Justice. 1 9 Noting the Canadian reservation in this regard,
the press release added: "[S]uch action only prevents Canada from being
forced into the Court. It does not preclude Canada voluntarily joining with
us in submitting these disputes to the Court or an appropriate chamber of
the Court." 120
Concerning the virtual enclosure of the Arctic corridor by the claim to a
12-mile territorial sea, the release observed that although Washington was
willing to accept such an extension, it would only be acceptable "as part of
an international treaty also providing for freedom of passage through and
over international straits."'' 21 The United States Government was apprehen-

sive that the Canadian legislation, if unchallenged, might serve as a precedent
for "unilateral infringement of the freedom of the seas" in other parts of the
world with the result that "merchant shipping would be severely restricted
22
and naval mobility would be seriously jeopardized."'
The State Department also entreated Canada to join in sponsoring an
international maritime conference to study the problem of pollution controls
in the Arctic and to devise necessary preventative measures on a multilateral
basis. In this respect, the statement continued: "We believe the Arctic beyond
national jurisdiction should be subject to internationally agreed rules protecting its assets, both living and non-living, and have noted with pleasure
the Canadian Prime Minister's public statement that Canada would be prepared to enter into multilateral efforts to develop agreed rules of environmental protection."'2 3 (And while Prime Minister Trudeau had, indeed,
made such utterances, he had envisaged the rules as complementing, and not
replacing, the two bills discussed earlier.)
Jolm Stevenson, the State Department's legal counsel, in an address in
New York, reiterated the American position on the extension of Canadian
territorial waters to twelve miles. 24 The establishment of such maritime belts
throughout the world, he contended, should be accomplished in conjunction

119. For the text of the United States press release, see DEB. H.C. 5923 (1970).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. The statement issued to the press and set out in Hansard was similar to one
handed to Canadian Ambassador Marcel Cadieux in Washington by U. Alexis Johnson,
the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs. See N. Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1970, at 54, col. 1.
124. The Globe and Mail (Toronto), April 10, 1970, at 1, col. 9.
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with a new international agreement "providing for freedom of transit through
and over international straits and carefully defined preferential fishing rights
for coastal states on the high seas.'

12

There were also, however, some American dissenters from the official
Washington rejection of the Canadian Arctic initiatives. In an editorial, the
New York Times supported both pieces of legislation, saying of the antipollution bill that "special circumstances" offered "a compelling argument
for Canada's unilateral action," and that in extending its territorial sea
"Canada is only doing what 57 other nations already have done-and what
the United States government has recently indicated it is prepared to do."
The newspaper praised the Canadian actions as forestalling pollution in a
peculiarly sensitive environment and also as serving to protect "a heritage
that is precious to all mankind."12 Both Alaskan senators also approved the
legislation, at least in its general features, as representing the "northern point
of view."127 American commentators usually agreed with the intent of the
legislation, insofar as it sought to protect the environment, but were less
receptive to possible restrictions on the movement of United States naval
vessels and merchant ships through Arctic straits.
The Canadian reply to the United States remonstrance repeated the country's intention to proceed unilaterally with the legislation and expressed the
resolution not to resort, in any eventuality, to the World Court or to defer
to the decision of an international conference of shipowning states for the
resolution of what was, in the Canadian government's opinion, a matter falling solely within its domestic jurisdiction.12 8 There followed the citation of a
number of instances in which unilateral actions by other states (such as
President Truman's 1945 proclamation claiming jurisdiction over the adjacent continental shelf) had later, through repetition and reciprocity, crystallized into customary international law and ultimately had been codified
in international conventions.129 What real chance was there in 1945 (according to the innuendo in the Canadian reply), that the unilateral American
claim to the continental shelf would have been upheld by an international
tribunal? In an obvious reference to the Connally Amendment,130 the Canadian note added: "Canada's readiness to submit to the international judicial

125. Id.
126. N. Y. Times, April 20, 1970, at 38, col. 2.
127. Both Republican Senator Theodore Stevens and Democratic Senator Mike Gravel
supported the legislation, at least insofar as it sought to combat pollution. See, e.g., The
Globe and Mail (Toronto), April 10, 1970, at 1, col. 9.
128. See DEB. H.C. 6029 (1970).
129. See, e.g., Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 56.

130. 61 Stat. 1218, 2, cl. 6 (Aug. 14, 1946), T.I.A.S. No. 1598. Declaration by the
President of the United States of America respecting Recognition by the United States of
America of the Compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice: "Provided
that this declaration shall not apply to . . . (b) disputes in regard to matters which are
essentially within the dominant jurisdiction of the United States of America as determined

by the United States of America."
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process remains general in scope and is subject only to certain limited and
clearly defined exceptions rather than to a general exception which can be
defined at will so as to include any particular matter." Finally, the note
argued, while it was necessary to act for ecological reasons, international law
in its present state was defective in the environmental area and a possible
judicial resolution would prejudice Canada's good moral case.1 31
Since the passage of the Canadian legislation in mid-1970 the debate has
intensified. "However legitimate Canadian concerns," says international
lawyer Louis Henkin, "however true its accusations against shipping states,
however urgent the dangers of pollution, the fact is that it is asserting new
unilateral rights as a coastal state against the world.' 132 If the high seas are,
in the words of classical international jurists res communis omnium, then
regulation should, according to this view, be by the world community rather
than by individual states.
Citing the Trail Smelter Arbitration"'3 as authority for the proposition
that the facilitation of marine pollution by states amounts to an international
tort, J. A. Beesley of the Canadian External Affairs Department counters:
"It would be a distortion of the freedom of the high seas to view it as a
license to pollute the marine environment and the shores of other states, and
to argue that states are barred from taking preventive protective measures
against polluting activities on the high seas."" 34 Beesley strikes a chord here
sometimes mentioned by defenders of the legislation: ultimately the extension
of pollution control over the high seas by coastal states rests on an asserted
right of self defense. In the case of ocean pollution, as in the case of enemy
attack, there is an external threat posing grave risks to national security. The
effects of such a threat, in fact, could cause what some delegates to the United
Nations sponsored 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment
termed "ecocide." In the case of pollution as in that of external attack, the
threat may be debilitating or lethal before an effective international reply
can be organized. With ten million tons of oil spilled into the world's oceans
annually, the ineffectiveness of unilateral measures to combat the problem on
a global scale has prompted continuing consideration of the menace by international conferences. The Canadians hope to obtain some support at such
meetings. Already, in a Geneva meeting preparatory to the 1973 Conference
on the Law of the Sea, Australia, Norway, and Spain, as well as Canada, have
asserted a right to defend their shores from pollution emanating from the
high seas." 5

131. For text, see DEn. H.C. 6027-30 (1970).
132. Henlein, Arctic Anti-Pollution: Does Canada Make-or Break-InternationalLaw?,
65 Am. J. IN'L L. 131, 135 (1971).
133. Note 1 supra.
134. Beesley, Rights and Responsibilities of Arctic Coastal States: The Canadian View,
3 J. MARrriME L. & ComusRcE 1, 9 (1971).
135. See Beesley, The Law of The Sea Conference: Factors Behind Canada's Stance,
July-Aug. 1972, at 28; Langley & Edgerton, The United States
INTERNATIONAL PtspEarCSI
at Stockholm, THE NATiON, July 10, 1972, at 7.
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TOWARDS A CONCEPT OF POLAR LAW

In considering the effective occupation test of sovereignty laid down by
Huber in the Palmas arbitration' 3" or the hinterland test of the Labrador
case' 37 or the "superior title" principle enunciated by the World Court in
the Eastern Greenland case138 one almost gets a sense of retrogression. The
vocabulary of these legal controversies is replete with the idiom of the
colonial era. However, the successors of the native princes with whom the
Dutch East India Company dealt for three centuries on the Isle of Palmas
are now delegates to the United Nations, framing draft legislation on human
rights before the Third Committee. In the post-colonial world there are no
unappropriated hinterlands waiting demarcation through the drainage basin
test, and the urgent issue in most undeveloped areas is not one of political
sovereignty among rival European states, but of the education, economic
progress, and ultimately the emancipation of native peoples. In such a revolutionary context, how appropriate are the principles of "symbolic annexation"
applied to Clipperton Island,"39 or the norm of "effective occupation" used
in other territorial disputes? Similarly, rules developed in one context may
not be easily applied to another. For instance, in applying the "natural
prolongation" test of the North Sea case140 to the continental shelf of the
Canadian Arctic, great difficulties arise as compared with the Siberian Arctic,
which has a much more gradual slope and is submerged under shallower
seas. Elongated underwater canyons threading through the sea floor of the
Canadian Arctic, notably in Melville and Lancaster Sounds, reach a depth
of three or four times the 600 feet (or 200 meters) mentioned in the Continental Shelf Convention 41 as being an appropriate depth for delimiting
national claims to the shelf. If one considers that the whole Archipelago,
according to the logic of the North Sea case, might be considered as a geological extension of the Canadian mainland, a Canadian claim to the entire shelf
42
of the Archipelago would be enhanced.1
Yet granting the difficulty of formulating standards, there would seem
to be no compelling reasons why certain claims should not be entertained.
Claims to permanent ice in the Arctic or Antarctic should seemingly be recognized, but they would have to be claims of a highly qualified nature. Such

136.

See text accompanying notes 30-31 supra.

137.

See text accompanying notes 51-53 supra.

138.
139.

See text accompanying notes 34-48 supra.
See Clipperton Island Case (Mexico and France), 26 AM. J.

140.
141.
142.

See 63 Ahi. J.

INT'L

L. 390 (1932).

L. 591 (1969).
Supra note 56, art. I.
The Continental Shelf Convention, art. I, also permits claims where the superINT'L

jacent waters "admit of the exploitation of the natural resources of" the area. The question
of the maximum permissible extent of the shelf, then, will vary according to whether
"exploitability" or "200 meters" is the norm. In view of rapidly developing technology,

however, quaere whether any portion of continental shelf would be immune from national
claims if "exploitability" is the proper standard.
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claims should not embrace collateral assertions of title to superjacent airspace
or subjacent seabed. For one thing, the more common type of territorial claims,
embracing title to airspace, have been limited in the past to land. Their
extension to Arctic ice would enclose and subject to national jurisdiction
great aerial concourses of the world that it would be in the community interest to preserve unfettered from local regulation. In the water under the ice,
however, community interests may be different. The spectre of a giant submarine tanker 43 having an accident with the resultant oil spillage trapped
and refrigerated under the ice for decades is enough to give one an ecological
trauma. It would seem that in the latter case a state claiming permanent ice
should have the right to make reasonable regulations to reduce such a
possibility.
The risk of a disastrous spillage of oil in frigid Arctic waters, which are
subject to a much slower rate of atmospheric dissipation than waters in the
tropics,'" underscores the need for some supervision of tanker movements in

the Arctic. Yet the probability of securing adequate legislation through international conference is low. Surely, states peculiarly susceptible to pollution
hazards should be able to frame legislation that promotes not only their own
interests, but also preserves essential environmental standards for their hemispheric neighbors.
If such an anti-pollution zone is established, it seems reasonable that
Canada should go somewhat further than she has in meeting the objections
of the United States and other countries in her assumption of legal control
over the Northwest Passage. While it is true that the Passage is not yet an
international sea route, there has been considerable navigation through it
and in the vicinity of the Archipelago; the 1969 voyage of the Manhattan

was only the latest of a succession of such voyages.' Even if such relatively
narrow channels as Barrow Strait and Prince of Wales Strait are now enclosed, because of the importance of the Arctic "corridor" as a future maritime thoroughfare, the Canadian government should, while asking shipping
states to observe the norms of the anti-pollution zone, create a right of innocent passage through the entire corridor notwithstanding the fact that part of
it may now be classified as internal waters. External Affairs Minister Sharp,

143. In January 1970, General Dynamics Corporation offered to build six 175,000 ton
submarine tankers for oil companies with interests in the Prudhoe Bay area. See DEB. H.C.

2719 (1970).
144. Cf., e.g., Schachter & Serwer, Marine Pollution Problems and Remedies, 65 Am.
J. INT'L L. 84, 89 (1971).
145. Other transits of the Northwest Passage are credited to Robert McClure (18541855); Amundsen's Gjoa (1903-1906); the Royal Canadian Mounted Police vessel St. Roch
(1940-1942 and again in 1944); H.M.C.S. Labrador (1954); United States Coast Guard
vessels Storis, Bramble, and Spar (1957); United States Seadragon (nuclear-powered submarine 1960 and 1962) and the John A. Macdonald (1966). Transits in the vicinity of the
North Pole, under Arctic ice, were made by United States Nautilus (August 1958); United
States Skate (August 1958 and March 1959); United States Sargo (February 1960); United
States Seadragon and Skate (August 1962); and the Soviet nuclear-powered submarine
Leninshy Komsomol made a transit in the vicinity of the North Pole in January 1963.
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indeed, has coupled the pollution problem with the possible establishment of
such a regime:

1 46

There is a school of thought, for example, that the status of the waters
of the Arctic Archipelago fall somewhere between the regime of internal waters and the regime of the territorial sea. Certainly Canada cannot accept any right of innocent passage if that right is defined as

precluding the right of the coastal state to control pollution in such
waters.
In the domestic context, Prime Minister Trudeau has frequently deplored
an exaggerated nationalism (as typified, for example, by the separatist movement in his native Province of Quebec) and the creation of such a right of
innocent passage would reflect, in the international arena, his subordination
of local sovereignty to broader community interests. 147 At the same time, such
passage should be genuinely innocent in the sense that oil tankers, when
invoking it, would be obliged to comply with reasonable regulations made to
prevent irreparable harm in the delicate Arctic ecology. Just as the right of
warships to innocent passage may be subject to some limitations, so should
the right of huge oil tankers that may jeopardize the security of the coastal
state, albeit in a wider context.
A consideration of the Arctic and the Antarctic with all their geographical
and climatic peculiarities emphasizes the distinctiveness of the polar regions
as contrasted with the temperate and tropical zones. Their vastness, emptiness, barrenness, and susceptibility to pollution has rendered special legislalation necessary and has led, as in the Eastern Greenland case, 148 to the development of special norms for the acquisition of title. In an era of technological
revolution, however, when new possibilities of settlement and the extraction
of natural resources are opening up, one might inquire into the appropriateness of these norms in polar areas. With occupancy and control becoming
more and more possible, there are many ways in which states can cooperate
in the Arctic.
It might be suggested, accordingly, on the analogy of the Antarctic settlement of 1959 that without renouncing sovereignty, which would generally be
unacceptable, 4 9 the various Arctic states might cooperate to a greater degree
to promote general interests in the North. Because of the slow circular motion
of the Arctic icecap the same ice will be above different Arctic states at different times. Rather than permitting claims to permanent ice, would not some
form of condominium by all Arctic states to control pollution and to further

146. DEB. H.C. 6015 (1970).
147.

See, e.g., B. THORDARSON, TRUDEAU AND FOREIGN POLICY 62-63 (1972).

148. [1933] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 53, at 22.
149. The Russians, for example, are most insistent in urging their claims to Arctic
sovereignty, laying claim not only to island groups but also to extensive Arctic seas, the
latter claim not generally being cognizable in the West. See I. LAPE NA, CONCEPTIONS
SOVITIQUES DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC

260 (1954).
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scientific and meteorological research be a notable advance? Perhaps, too, in
this era of detente, just as Antarctica has been demilitarized, the Canadian
and Siberian Arctics, and perhaps other Arctic areas, might also be demilitarized.- Another possibility would be to use a proportion of the riches of
the Arctic seabed and continental shelf to improve the lot of native peoples
in northern areas. One might specify further areas of mutual interest where
common action is desirable, but the more important matter is, as in the
Antarctic, the expansion of international cooperation in a region where the
forces of nature make life difficult and pose particularly challenging problems.

150. Such a proposal recalls President Eisenhower's "open skies" proposal, which served
a somewhat different purpose, but would have employed the airspace of the Arctic to facilitate
reciprocal inspection of Soviet and Western territory.
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